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We study the propensity of disabled persons to engage in volunteer activity with the Participation 
and Activity Limitation Survey (PALS) -- a unique Canadian dataset which provides extensive 
information on disabled persons as well as volunteering behaviour. Our principal focus is on the 
effects of various income support programs on disabled person’s participation in volunteer 
activities. We find that certain income support programs (e.g., workers’ compensation) are 
associated with decreases in the probability of volunteering while others (e.g., Pension Plans) are 
associated with increases in the propensity to volunteer. The reason is that not all income support 
programs are identical with respect to their implications for unpaid work. There are some – like 
workers compensation – that embody strong disincentives to volunteering while others like 
public Pensions that explicitly encourage unpaid work. Our conclusion is that program 
characteristics can significantly affect volunteering. This conclusion is further supported when 
we look at other income support programs that embody ambiguous or no incentive effects. As 
one would anticipate, these ‘incentive neutral’ programs have no significant impact on 
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We study the propensity of disabled persons to engage in volunteer activity with 
the Participation and Activity Limitation Survey (PALS) -- a unique Canadian 
dataset which provides extensive information on disabled persons as well as 
volunteering behaviour. Our principal focus is on the effects of various income 
support programs on disabled person’s participation in volunteer activities.  
 
Our main policy conclusion is that income support programs accessed by 
disabled persons can have substantial incentive effects on deterring or 
encouraging volunteer activity.  The deterrent effect occurs when the recipients 
are monitored carefully and volunteering could serve as a signal that the disabled 
person is able to engage in activity that could resemble work.  This type of 
income support creates a strong incentive not to volunteer, as this activity could 
jeopardize their receipt of the income support.  This was the case with workers’ 
compensation which has stringent monitoring in terms of work ability and where 
volunteering could easily be interpreted as being able to return to work, 
especially in “light” duties.  In contrast, where volunteering is specifically allowed 
and actively encouraged, as in CPP-D, it is much more likely to occur.  In income 
support programs that had potentially offsetting incentive effects (welfare, 
unemployment insurance and private insurance programs) or no incentive effects 
on volunteering (GIS, veteran’s disability and  C/QPP early retirement) no 
significant effects were found.  
 
In essence, the negative or positive incentives embedded in our income support 
programs accessed by the disabled respectively discourage or encourage 
volunteering, and those programs that have no incentive effects have no effect 
on volunteering.  Given the importance of volunteering for both the volunteers 
and the recipients, and the fact that volunteering can be a viable way for disabled 
persons to “test the waters” for engaging in more formal work activities, these 
incentive effects merit more attention as possible policy levers to facilitate 
volunteering on the part of the growing number of disabled persons in Canada 
and in the US.    
 
From an analytical perspective, these results also emphasize the importance of 
incorporating incentive-based modelling into areas of individual behaviour that 
normally eschew the intrusion of economic analysis. Even after controlling for a 
number of significant ‘warm-glow’ predictors of volunteer behaviour found in the 
traditional literature, we still detected highly significant and empirically important 
effects linked to two income support programs, which clearly diverge in their 
promotion of volunteerism. This brings to light the need to probe as deeply as 
possible into the complete set of intrinsic and extrinsic factors that impact specific 
individual behaviour – in this case volunteerism. Our confidence in these 
conclusions is enhanced by the fact that our other empirical results were 
generally consistent with household production and social capital perspectives.  
This was the case, for example, with the strong positive relationship between volunteering and such factors as education, time spent on childcare, being 
female, and the lesser severity of the disability.   
 
Future research should determine the extent to which worker adaptation and 
flexible benefits that explicitly recognize the value of volunteer activity can 
improve the volunteer propensity of the disabled.  A better understanding of the 
long-term impacts of these alternatives can be used to inform future legislation 
directed at improving the employability of disabled persons. Finally, the creation 
of a survey series that provides researchers with a comparable question by 
which to measure the propensity of different subgroups to volunteer would also 
be a major improvement. 
  





Several interrelated concerns, of policy importance and academic interest, prompt a focus 
on the volunteer activity of disabled persons.   First, there has been a rapid growth in the number 
of persons who collect disability benefits from public programs and a decline in employment of 
disabled persons (e.g., Bound and Waidmann (2002), Burkhauser Houtenville and Wittenburg 
(2003) in the U.S, Campolieti and Lavis (2000) in Canada, Woodhams and Corby (2007) in UK). 
Second, engaging disabled persons in active employment is now regarded as important not only 
to reduce the numbers on income support but also to foster their integration into society.  Not 
surprisingly increased attention has recently been paid to various policy initiatives that facilitate 
the labour force participation of disabled persons (Woodhams and Corby, 2007).  Such initiatives 
include: reducing the work disincentives embedded in the various income support programs; 
reducing the barriers to returning to work through reasonable accommodation requirements on 
employers; facilitating the adaptation of disabled workers to their limitations (e.g., changing 
jobs, changing employers, changing the kind of work they do and how much work they do); 
reducing the effect of the disability through vocational rehabilitation; and improving the ability 
of the disabled to re-enter the labour market by providing additional education as well as job 
search assistance. 
  A neglected area -- and the focus of this analysis -- is volunteer activity for the disabled, 
both as a potential bridge to employment and as an activity that fosters their integration into 
society.  The usefulness of volunteer activity as a bridge to paid employment in general has 
already been emphasized, especially given the substantial monetary return to time spent 
volunteering -- 6 to 7 percent estimated by Day and Devlin (1998 ) and 4 percent in Devlin 
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(2001).  Volunteering may also form a bridge to a deeper engagement in the workforce for many 
groups who normally have problems with transitions into the labour force such as youths 
(school-to-work transition), older workers (transition to retirement), and women and the 
unemployed (transition back to the labour market)
1.  The potential for volunteer activity to 
provide a bridge to paid employment is exhibited by the fact that the U.S. Civil Service 
Commission and a number of federal agencies regard volunteer activity as the equivalent of time 
spent in paid employment in terms of giving credit for work experience (Dicken and Blomberg 
1988).  Canadian survey evidence indicates that 71 percent of employers either encourage or 
accommodate employee volunteer activity during working hours and/or encourage employees to 
volunteer on their own time.  The most common reasons employers gave for such support were 
to improve their public image, to improve employee morale and to improve relations with the 
surrounding community (Easwaramoorthy 2006).  Some private sector employers, such as Delta 
Airlines, have also used volunteer activity as a transitional activity in their return-to-work 
strategy for injured employees who are well enough to do volunteer work but not yet well 
enough to return to their regular job.
2  In spite of its obvious policy and practical importance, to 
our knowledge, the volunteer activity of disabled persons (to facilitate transitions back to work) 
has not been systematically analysed. 
  A small number of Canadian empirical studies have analysed the determinants of 
volunteering in general and for particular groups, and their general conclusions will be contrasted 
with ours for disabled persons.  Vaillancourt (1994) and Day and Devlin (1996) use the 1987 
Survey of Volunteering (VAT), and Hall et. al. (1998, 2001) use the 1997 and 2000 National 
Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating (NSGVP), respectively, but provide only 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Gomez and Gunderson (2001, 2003) and Jones (1999, 2000) 
2 USA Today, September 1, 1999, p. 3B. 
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cross-tabulations that do not control for the influence of other factors. Devlin (2001) also uses 
the 1997 survey but focuses on the impact of volunteering on earnings, with only passing 
reference to the determinants of the decision to volunteer. Gomez and Gunderson (2003) use the 
General Social Survey of 1994, but focus on characteristics of work and family as influencing 
volunteer activity; they have no information on disabled persons or income support programs.  
Other studies deal only with particular subgroups – youths (Jones 2000), seniors (Jones 1999) 
and the unemployed (Gomez and Gunderson 2001).  None of these studies, however, analyze the 
volunteer activity of disabled persons.  To our knowledge this is also the case with U.S. studies. 
  This paper purposes to fill the gap in the literature by using Statistics Canada’s 
Participation and Activity Limitation Survey (PALS), a unique dataset that focuses exclusively 
on disabled individuals with activity limitations and that has measures of voluntary activity as 
well as information on demographics, educational attainment, income and household 
characteristics.  Most importantly, PALS also contains information on income support programs 
that provide some income to disabled persons. The rules governing the receipt of benefits in 
these programs can alter an individual’s incentives to volunteer. Consequently, the principal 
focus of our analysis will be to determine whether such programs (intentionally or 
unintentionally) influence the propensity of disabled persons to volunteer.  As indicated, the 
work disincentive effects of various disability income support programs has been the subject of 
considerable research; however, their effect on volunteering on the part of disabled persons has 
not been empirically investigated.  
  A unique feature of this paper, therefore, is that it looks at the volunteer activity of 
disabled persons principally from an economic lens - in contrast to models of volunteerism that 
typically invoke either personal motives, theories of self-actualization, values or increasingly 
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social capital. Though our empirical and theoretical approach encompasses these accepted 
volunteering variables, this is the first study to:  (1) identify the disincentives/incentives to 
volunteer activity embodied in various income support programs for the disabled; and (2) to 
estimate whether these incentives/disincentives are in fact associated with differences in the 
propensity for disabled individuals to engage in volunteer activity. We find that programs like 
workers’ compensation that embody strong disincentives to volunteering are associated with 
decreases in the probability of volunteering. Conversely, the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan 
disability program, which encourages volunteering, is associated with increases in the propensity 
to volunteer.  Other income support programs that embody ambiguous or no incentive effects 
have no significant impact on volunteering. 
  The paper is structured as follows. Following a background look into disability policy in 
Section 2, the paper discusses the conceptual framework in Section 3. Section 4 contains a 
discussion of our data and the empirical approach, while Section 5 presents the empirical 
findings. We provide a synthesis of our results and suggestions for further enquiry in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Disability Policy in Canada and Incentives to Volunteer Embedded in Income Support 
Programs   
 
The last several decades have seen a gradual shift from passive income support in terms 
of public programs for disabled persons, to an increased emphasis on enabling their reintegration 
into the labour market.  In the United States, the primary focus of these efforts has been the 
American with Disabilities Act (ADA), which implemented comprehensive barrier removal 
legislation by implementing reasonable accommodation requirements on employers.  In Canada, 
there has been much less emphasis on barrier removal legislation. In contrast, Canadian efforts 
that have tried to assist the re-entry of disabled persons into the labour market have primarily 
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occurred via the Employment Assistance for People with Disabilities program and the ‘In 
Unison’ agreements with the provincial social assistance ministries (Campolieti and Lavis 2000), 
which have been recently replaced by the Multilateral Framework for Labour Market 
Agreements for Persons with Disabilities. These programs provide job search assistance as well 
as education and other services that help disabled persons become better prepared for a re-entry 
into the labour market. In addition, these programs also try to encourage employers to consider 
disabled workers for employment. 
Canada has a wide range of benefit or income support programs that disabled persons can 
access.  They can create various (likely unintended) disincentives to the use of volunteering as a 
way of “testing the waters” to form a bridge for disabled persons to engage in active paid 
employment.  The disincentives generally arise from three factors: the scrutiny that program 
administrators apply for the recipient to maintain their eligibility for benefits; the extent to which 
volunteering could jeopardize those benefits; and the magnitude of the loss of benefits if they are 
jeopardized by volunteering.  While such dimensions are difficult to precisely delineate, the 
programs can be grouped according to the extent to which they may deter volunteer activity
3.   
At the one extreme, workers’ compensation closely scrutinizes its recipients with respect 
to their ability to return to work.  In many cases, they may be expected to return to “light duties.”  
In such circumstances volunteering could be interpreted as being able to return to light duties and 
hence jeopardize continued receipt of benefits.  Since persons on workers’ compensation were 
once employed, their potential employability itself is not questionable except for their residual 
level disability after they reach the point of maximum medical improvement.  To the extent that 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of the design features of these various income support programs see, for example, Campolieti and 
Lavis (2000) or Gunderson, Gildner and King (1997) and references cited therein.  
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volunteering could call into question that their ability to work after they reach the point of 
maximum medical improvement, the disincentive to volunteer could be quite substantial.  
At the other extreme, the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan Disability (C/QPP-D) program 
specifically allows disabled persons the option of taking on volunteer work without any threat of 
reducing the size of their disability pensions.  The fact that volunteering is specifically 
mentioned as acceptable suggests that it is encouraged as a prelude to facilitate a more formal re-
entry to the labour market or as a way for disabled persons to maintain an attachment with the 
world of work, after formal exit from the labour force has occurred. 
In between these two extremes that respectively discourage volunteering (workers’ 
compensation) and encourage volunteering (CPP-disability) the other income support programs 
for disabled persons either have ambiguous or no anticipated effects on the incentive to 
volunteer.   
Welfare or social assistance recipients are under considerable scrutiny for maintaining 
their welfare receipt, as was the case for persons on workers’ compensation.  While volunteering 
could be interpreted as being able to work (and hence jeopardizing continued receipt of benefits), 
it is also the case that welfare recipients are generally expected to participate in employment 
assistance activities if they are able to do so.  Volunteering can be considered as consistent with 
such activities and hence would not jeopardize receipt of welfare benefits by volunteering for 
that reason.     
Employment insurance scrutinizes its recipients for their ability to return to work but not 
to the extent of workers’ compensation or welfare.  Furthermore, in some cases like maternity or 
parental leave, recipients are not required to be seeking work so that volunteering would not 
jeopardize their receipt of benefits.  In other cases, they are allowed to take training or other 
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human capital improvement programs without having to be looking for work.  To the extent that 
these are recognized as possible avenues for human capital development that can serve as a 
bridge to subsequent employment, volunteer activity may also be regarded as such a bridge and 
hence encouraged.   
Private disability insurance programs, such as employer-based short-term and long-term 
disability, tend to extensively scrutinize their recipients for their ability to return to work. This 
scrutiny may result in the termination of benefits for recipients for those who engage in 
volunteering. On the other hand, this disincentive effect may be offset by the fact that private 
disability insurers also have a strong profit maximizing incentive to allow disabled persons to 
“test the waters” by volunteering in the hope that this may facilitate their return to work.   
While welfare, employment insurance and private disability insurance may have 
offsetting incentive effects with respect to volunteering, other programs are neutral in their 
incentive effects and hence are expected to also have no effect on volunteering after controlling 
for the other determinants of volunteering.  The Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) is a 
demogrant given to individuals over aged 65 who are low-income and is a supplement to Old 
Age Security, which is a demogrant given to all Canadian over the age of 65 subject to certain 
residency requirements.  In neither program would volunteering be interpreted as being able to 
work and hence jeopardizing receipt of benefits.  The same applies to veterans’ pensions in that 
recipients are not scrutinized for being able to work and hence volunteering would not jeopardize 
benefits. Given the age restrictions on our sample, receipt of these benefits by individuals in the 
sample would generally be because a spouse was receiving the benefits, particularly for the GIS.  
The C/QPP early retirement benefits require that the person “substantially cease 
working” which is interpreted as earning no more than one-quarter of the average industrial wage.  
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Although the early retirement benefits do not explicitly exempt volunteer activity, they do 
specifically exempt a small amount of paid work suggesting that volunteering is at least allowed and 
possibly encouraged to facilitate the transition to retirement.   
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
 
  Since volunteering is a form of work (albeit unusual in that it is unpaid work) our 
empirical specification of the determinants of volunteering utilizes the standard labour supply 
model with its emphasis on such factors as income and the opportunity cost of time.  Particular 
attention is paid to the nature and severity of the disability and to the nature of its limitations, as 
these may affect the decision to volunteer, just as they would affect the decision to do paid work 
in the labour market.  As indicated, particular emphasis is placed on the effect that different 
income maintenance programs for the disabled may have on their incentive to volunteer.   
  Given the unusual nature of volunteer work, our empirical results are also interpreted 
through a broader lens to incorporate concepts of ‘social capital’ (Putnam 1995) as well as the 
household production function perspective where individuals and households value goods, 
leisure and charitable activity as normal goods.  Charitable activity is “produced” via inputs of 
volunteer time, highlighting the importance of substituting time over different ages in the 
lifecycle.  It also highlights the reinforcing dual substitution effects associated with a higher 
opportunity cost of time: the substitution effect in consumption as individuals economize on their 
scarce use of time by “consuming” fewer charitable activities that are time intensive; and the 
substitution effect in production as they substitute money for time in “producing” a given 
amount of charitable activity. 
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  The household production function perspective incorporates the fact that the decision to 
engage in charitable activity can be based on various factors
4 including altruism -- to help a 
cause -- with different people having different amounts of altruism as well as different causes.  
The satisfaction of volunteering can have an intrinsic consumption value – yielding a “warm 
glow” -- to those volunteering.  It can also have an investment component in terms of mutual gift 
giving, reputation, standing in the community, constituency building, resume building, 
networking, and experience -- or in the case of the disabled, perhaps testing the waters before 
engaging in formal work. The household production function approach also emphasizes that 
volunteering is affected by the extent to which different persons within the household allocate 
their time to labour market versus household activity.  Those who require more of their time at 
home (e.g., for the care of very young children) are less likely to have time to volunteer.  
Working in the other direction, some volunteer activity may be complementary to other activities 
of children within the family, such as school, club or team activities. 
  The household production function perspective also emphasises that variables such as a 
person’s expected wage can have complicated effects on volunteering.  As in the conventional 
labour supply model, persons with high potential wages may be less likely to volunteer because 
of the high opportunity cost of their time.  However, the “production function” perspective  
highlights that their high expected wage also means that they may be more “productive” in 
certain types of volunteer activity and hence may volunteer more, or be pressed into volunteer 
service where their skills are important (Freeman 1996).  
In essence, the social capital orientation of our approach combined with the household 
production function perspective provides a conceptual framework that is useful for interpreting 
                                                 
4 Various rationales for volunteering are discussed, for example, in Andreoni (1990), Rose-Ackerman (1996) and 
Woolley (2001, 2003). 
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the empirical relationships between volunteering and the observed characteristics of disabled 
persons.  This underlying conceptual framework will be used to interpret the empirical 
relationships that emerge and that will be discussed subsequently in Section 5. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Specification 
 
The estimates in this paper are based on Statistics Canada’s Participation and Activity 
Limitation Survey (PALS).  The PALS (conducted about 4 months after the census) uses the 
1991 Census of Canada as a sampling frame and a series of disability filter questions to select 
potential respondents.  Importantly for our purposes, the PALS contains information on 
volunteering as well as detailed information on the nature of the individual’s disabilities as well 
as the effect of their disabilities on household and labour market activities -- variables that are 
typically unavailable in most datasets.  The PALS also has a wide range of personal and 
demographic characteristics that can be important control variables, and that yield interesting 
information in their own right.  We restricted the sample to individuals aged 15-64 who were 
non-employed. 
The outcome variable of interest is whether the individual participated in a volunteer 
activity or not in the 12 months prior to the survey. This dummy variable takes the value 1 if the 
individual engaged in any of the eight specified areas of volunteer activity in the survey and zero 
otherwise. These eight areas reflect specific questions over the nature of the respondent’s 
‘formal’ participation in volunteer activity.
 5  
                                                 
5 These include: (1) help to organize or supervise activities or events for an organization; 2) canvass, campaign or 
fund raise as an unpaid volunteer; 3) sit as an unpaid member of a board or committee; 4) do any consulting, 
executive, office or administrative work as a volunteer; 5) provide information, help to educate, lobby or influence 
public opinion on behalf of an organization; 6) teach, coach, provide care or friendly visits through an organization; 
7) collect, serve or deliver food or other goods as a volunteer through an organization; and, 8) do any other unpaid 
volunteer activities (including help given to schools, religious organizations and community organizations). 
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The probability of engaging in volunteer work is specified to be a function of a number of 
theoretically relevant variables grouped as: income maintenance or benefit programs they 
received income from (the focus of our analysis) and that can affect their incentive to volunteer 
(workers’ compensation, welfare, employment insurance, private disability insurance, 
Guaranteed Income Supplement, veterans pensions, C/QPP early retirement, and C/QPP-
disability); individual characteristics (gender, marital status, age, education, poverty status and 
whether their disability was present at birth); and household characteristics (homeowner, family 
income, time spent on childcare).  The rich and extensive information on the person’s disabilities 
and health problems is also used to create a number of control variables typically not measured 
in conventional datasets: whether they had multiple health problems; the nature of their health 
problems; their severity as indicated by whether their health problems disadvantaged them at 
work; and the type of activity limitation. 
Mean values for the independent variables are given in the first column of Table 1.  As 
indicated, respondents are reasonably well distributed across the various categories like gender, 
education, marital status, income and time spent on childcare.  Twenty-two percent had the 
disability since birth and 35 percent fall below the low-income cut-off.  Smaller proportions 
receive income from some of the benefit programs (e.g., welfare, GIS) so that it may be difficult 
to identify effects from such programs.  Forty-eight percent of the respondents had more than 
one health problem, with musculoskeletal and soft tissue problems and the “other grouping” 
being by far the most common problems.  Limitations arising from pain, mobility and agility 
were the most common activity limitations.  About 26 percent of the respondents reported that 
their disability disadvantaged them mildly at work, 39 percent moderately and 35 percent 
severely. 




5. Empirical Results  
 
  Our discussion of the empirical results will focus on the marginal effects (i.e., the 
changes in the probability of volunteering) of column 3 in Table 1 as derived from the probit 
coefficients in column 2.  The magnitude of these effects should be interpreted relative to the 
average probability of volunteering for the disabled as given by the mean value of the dependent 
variable of 0.337 – that is, 34 percent of the respondents volunteered in at least one of eight 
volunteer activities in the year prior to the survey.  
 
The Effect of Pubic and Private Income Support Programs 
  As indicated previously, the various benefit programs can be grouped into three 
categories based on the extent to which they create disincentives or incentives to volunteer.  At 
the one extreme workers’ compensation has strong disincentives to volunteer because recipients 
are extensively scrutinized and volunteering could be interpreted by program administrators as 
the recipients being able to return to work and engage in paid employment so that volunteering 
could jeopardize the receipt of income support.  At the other extreme, C/QPP-Disability 
specifically allows disabled persons to volunteer without any threat of clawing back their 
disability payments, suggesting that it is encouraged either as a prelude to facilitate a more 
formal re-entry to the labour market or as a way for disabled persons to maintain an attachment 
with the world of work.  The other income support programs for the disabled either have 
potentially offsetting incentive effects (welfare, unemployment insurance and private insurance 
programs) or they have no incentive effects on volunteering (GIS, veteran’s disability, and  
C/QPP early retirement).  
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  The estimates are consistent with the anticipated incentive effects of the different income 
support programs for disabled persons.  Disabled persons on workers’ compensation are almost 
16 percentage points less likely to volunteer compared to other non-employed disabled persons.  
This is a statistically significant and large (47 percent) decrease in the probability of volunteering 
relative to the average rate of volunteering of 34 percent.  This strong deterrent effect highlights 
the substantial scrutiny and risk of benefit termination in this program.  
In contrast, in the C/QPP disability program where volunteering is explicitly allowed or 
encouraged without jeopardizing benefits, disabled persons are approximately 18 percentage 
points more likely to volunteer compared to disabled persons not on those programs.  This is a 
statistically significant and large (54 percent) increase relative to the mean of 0.34. 
No statistically significant relationship was found for the other income support programs 
for the disabled that either had potentially offsetting incentive effects (welfare, unemployment 
insurance and private insurance programs) or had no incentive effects on volunteering (GIS, 
veteran’s disability, and  C/QPP early retirement). This is consistent with the proposition that the 
receipt of these benefits is not jeopardized by volunteering. 
   Overall, the results for the different income support programs provide empirical 
confirmation for the notion that specific program design features can have important incentive 
effects for volunteering on the part of disabled persons.  Among disabled persons, volunteering 
can be encouraged if it is explicitly allowed to serve as bridge to employment without 
jeopardizing benefits.  In contrast, volunteering is (likely unintentionally) discouraged if it runs 
the risk of being interpreted by program administrators as a sign that the person could engage in 
paid employment.  In light of the potential for volunteering to enable disabled persons to “test 
the waters” as a possible bridge to employment, explicitly exempting volunteering from being 
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interpreted as a sign of being able to return to work merits consideration on the part of workers 
compensation program administrators. These findings also confirm that in modeling the 
determinants of volunteering (in general or for any subset of the population) a consideration of 
hidden (or not so hidden) incentives should be taken into account. The significance and empirical 
importance of our findings in relation to other more traditional volunteerism variables (discussed 
below) bares this last point out. 
 
The Effect of Individual Characteristics 
As in previous studies, males are less likely to volunteer than females, likely reflecting 
the higher opportunity cost of volunteering for males given their generally higher wages.
6   
Volunteering increases substantially with higher levels of education and it is especially 
high for persons with a university degree.
7  Even though they tend to have a higher opportunity 
cost of time, the household production function perspective emphasizes that higher educated 
persons are also more likely to be “productive” at volunteering, especially formal volunteering 
for organizations.  As well, their education may have exposed them to social issues and causes 
that are dealt with through the social capital formation associated with volunteering. 
  There is not a strong relationship between volunteering and age although volunteering is 
less in the middle age group of 45-55 relative to the 15-24 age group. There is also no 
statistically significant relationship between volunteering and marital status or whether the 
recipient fell below the low-income cutoff. 
                                                 
6 Day and Devlin (1996) and Vaillancourt (1994) find that males are less likely to volunteer, when there are no 
controls for wages.  Gomez and Gunderson (2003) are able to control for wages and find that males are more likely 
to volunteer than are females, as does Devlin (2001). 
7 This strong effect of education is also found in other Canadian studies such as Day and Devlin 1996, Devlin 2001, 
Gomez and Gunderson (2003) and Vaillancourt 1994. 
 




The Effect of Household Characteristics 
Home owners are more likely to volunteer than are non-home owners. This is a finding 
found in other studies and reinforces the view that being a home owner appears to increase the 
use of “voice” and investments in social and community capital, as the literature suggests 
(Gomez and Santor, 2001). 
There is generally not a strong relationship between volunteering and household income.  
Since household income includes both earnings and non-earned income, this likely reflects 
offsetting income and substitution effects. That is, households with higher income can afford the 
“normal” good of volunteering and its resulting “warm glow.”  But they also likely have higher 
earnings and this increases the opportunity cost of volunteering, inducing them to do less time 
intensive activities like volunteering (substitution effect in household consumption) and to 
substitute money for their more expensive time (substitution effect in household production) in 
producing a given level of charitable activity.   
Most of the estimates on the controls for childrearing responsibilities were not 
significant. However, disabled persons who spend 15-29 hours on childrearing duties are 
substantially more likely to volunteer, relative to those with no time spent on childrearing.  Many 
volunteer activities are associated with the raising of children in the broader community so that 
the reciprocal or collective benefits that come from volunteering when having to raise children 
may offset some of the domestic time pressures.  Volunteering and bringing up a child are 
complementary activities in spite of the time pressures of child rearing.  
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The Effect of the Nature and Severity of the Disability 
Being severely hindered by a disability has a significant negative effect on volunteering, 
likely reflecting the difficulty of engaging in any activity for the severely disabled.  This must be 
tempered, however, by the fact that having more than one health problem does not have a 
significant effect on volunteer activity. 
  The specific nature of the health problem generally does not significantly affect the 
probability of volunteering.  None of the estimates on the controls for specific activity limitations 
were statistically significant.  
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
  Our main policy conclusion is that income support programs accessed by disabled 
persons can have substantial incentive effects on deterring or encouraging volunteer activity.  
The deterrent effect occurs when the recipients are monitored carefully and volunteering could 
serve as a signal that the disabled person is able to engage in activity that could resemble work.  
This type of income support creates a strong incentive not to volunteer, as this activity could 
jeopardize their receipt of the income support.  This was the case with workers’ compensation 
which has stringent monitoring in terms of work ability and where volunteering could easily be 
interpreted as being able to return to work, especially in “light” duties.  In contrast, where 
volunteering is specifically allowed and actively encouraged, as in CPP-D, it is much more likely 
to occur.  In income support programs that had potentially offsetting incentive effects (welfare, 
unemployment insurance and private insurance programs) or no incentive effects on volunteering 
(GIS, veteran’s disability and  C/QPP early retirement) no significant effects were found.  
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  In essence, the negative or positive incentives embedded in our income support programs 
accessed by the disabled respectively discourage or encourage volunteering, and those programs 
that have no incentive effects have no effect on volunteering.  Given the importance of 
volunteering for both the volunteers and the recipients, and the fact that volunteering can be a 
viable way for disabled persons to “test the waters” for engaging in more formal work activities, 
these incentive effects merit more attention as possible policy levers to facilitate volunteering on 
the part of the growing number of disabled persons in Canada and in the US.    
From an analytical perspective, these results also emphasize the importance of 
incorporating incentive-based modelling into areas of individual behaviour that normally eschew 
the intrusion of economic analysis. The fact that even after controlling for a number of 
significant predictors of volunteer behaviour found in the traditional literature, we still detected 
highly significant and empirically important effects linked to two income support programs, 
which clearly diverge in their promotion of volunteerism, brings to light the need to probe as 
deeply as possible into the complete set of intrinsic and extrinsic factors that impact specific 
individual behaviour – in this case volunteerism. 
Our confidence in these conclusions is enhanced by the fact that our other empirical 
results were generally consistent with household production and social capital perspectives.  This 
was the case, for example, with the strong positive relationship between volunteering and such 
factors as education, time spent on childcare, being female, and the lesser severity of the 
disability.   
Future research should try to determine the extent to which worker adaptation and more 
flexible benefits payments that explicitly recognize the value of volunteer activity can improve 
the volunteer propensity of disabled persons.  A better understanding of the long-term impacts of 
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these alternatives can be used to inform future legislative efforts that are directed at improving 
the employability of disabled persons. Finally, the creation of a survey series that provides 
researchers with a comparable question by which to measure the propensity of different 
subgroups to volunteer would also be a major improvement. 
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Table 1: Probit Estimates of the Probability of Volunteer Activity amongst the Disabled 
 





Dependent Variable  0.337  --  --  -- 
        
Benefit Programs        
Workers’ compensation  0.102  -0.491***  -0.157***  -2.66 
Welfare 0.264  -0.049  -0.017  -0.38 
Employment insurance  0.168  0.089  0.032  0.65 
Private disability insurance  0.097  0.015  0.006  0.09 
Guaranteed income supplement  0.018  0.252  0.095  0.71 
Veteran pension  0.057  0.118  0.043  0.59 
C/QPP early retirement  0.051  0.147  0.054  0.63 
C/QPP disability  0.094  0.475***  0.181***  2.82 
        
Individual Characteristics        
Male 0.553  -0.167  -0.060  -1.60 
        
[Less than high school]  0.376       
High school graduate  0.272  0.430***  0.159***  3.45 
Trade certificate  0.145  0.388**  0.146**  2.55 
Post-secondary diploma  0.131  0.319**  0.120**  2.00 
University degree  0.076  0.763***  0.294***  3.96 
        
Disability present at birth  0.215  0.127  0.046  0.97 
        
[Age 15-24]  0.285       
Age 25-34  0.169  -0.181  -0.063  -1.14 
Age 35-44  0.297  -0.198  -0.069  -1.29 
Age 45-54  0.155  -0.418**  -0.138**  -2.19 
Age 55-64  0.094  -0.048  -0.017  -0.21 
        
Married 0.434  -0.164  -0.058  -1.36 
        
Below low income cut-off  0.345  0.090  0.033  0.73 
        
Household Characteristics         
        
Homeowner 0.636  0.218*  0.077  1.94 
        
[Income less than 10000]  0.516       
Income 10000-19000  0.244  0.155  0.056  1.27 
Income 20000-290000  0.105  0.079  0.029  0.44 
Income 30000-390000  0.061  0.599***  0.231***  2.68 
Income 40000-490000  0.039  0.314  0.119  1.18 
Income greater than 50000   0.035  0.431  0.165  1.58 
        
[No time on childcare]  0.639       
1-4 hrs on childcare  0.086  -0.126  -0.044  -0.71 
5-14 hrs on childcare  0.081  -0.086  -0.030  -0.47 
15-29 hrs on childcare  0.054  0.625***  0.241***  2.90 
30 plus hrs on childcare  0.140  0.107  0.039  0.69 
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Health Problem Controls        
More than one health problem  0.483  0.192  0.069  0.88 
        
Specific Health Problem         
Musculoskeletal and soft tissue 
Problems 
0.441 -0.063  -0.022  -0.39 
Mental disorders  0.247  0.051  0.018  0.30 
Vision problems  0.041  0.360  0.137  1.36 
Hearing problems  0.067  -0.145  -0.050  -0.60 
Nervous disorders  0.107  -0.033  -0.012  -0.18 
Heart and circulatory diseases  0.049  -0.186  -0.064  -0.75 
Respiratory diseases  0.038  0.371  0.141  1.43 
Diseases of the digestive system  0.037  -0.296  -0.098  -1.06 
Arthritis and rheumatism   0.130  0.004  0.001  0.02 
Neoplasms   0.009  -0.833  -0.226  -1.53 
Diseases of the endocrine system  0.027  1.098***  0.416***  3.47 
Other 0.532  -0.158  -0.057  -0.87 
        
Work Disadvantage          
[Mild] 0.261       
Moderate 0.389  -0.063  -0.023  -0.52 
Severe 0.350  -0.290**  -0.102**  -2.15 
        
Type of Activity Limitation         
Agility limitation  0.596  -0.068  -0.025  -0.54 
Mobility limitation  0.632  0.005  0.002  0.04 
Pain limitation  0.757  0.207  0.072  1.49 
Hearing limitation  0.179  0.204  0.075  1.38 
Vision limitation  0.161  -0.105  -0.037  -0.75 
Speech limitation  0.161  -0.121  -0.042  -0.83 
Other type of limitation  0.491  -0.042  -0.015  -0.34 
        
Sample Size   876       
        
Value of Log-Likelihood 
Function 
-502.12      
        
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of formal volunteering, based on 
whether the respondent participated in at least one (of seven) formal volunteer activities in the 
past 12 months. The excluded reference category is presented in square brackets. Single asterisk 
denotes statistically significant at 10 percent level, double asterisk at the 5 percent level, and 
triple asterisk at the 1 percent level. 
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